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Abstract. In 2015, Pope Francis released his second papal encyclical, Laudato 
Si’: On Care for Our Common Home (Francis, 2015), the central idea of 
which is the Holy Father’s concern for the future of our planet, our common 
home, and to seek sustainable and integral development. The purpose 
of this article is to examine critically and empirically the specific notion of 
ecological debt as described in the encyclical (Francis, 2015: 51 and 52), 
beginning with a historical background on the origins and use of the term. We 
then touch upon the Pope’s discussion of ecological debt and his indictment 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) in Laudato Si’, which resonate with 
the so-called pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) which states that pollution-
intensive industries in developed countries relocate their “dirty” industries to 
developing countries with relatively lax environmental regulations. In a similar 
vein, we propose that a rise in total greenhouse gases is associated with 
the resource extraction and commodity export-based activities of MNCs in 
developing countries where such activities and their resultant pollution are 
subject to less stringent regulations due to imperatives for economic growth. 
This creates an ecological debt when commodity exports from developing 
countries to more developed ones come at the cost of the environment in 
the former. Our article thus connects Laudato Si’ with PHH, enabling us to 
examine empirically the Pope’s statement that the “export of raw materials 
to satisfy markets in the industrialized North has caused harm locally” 
(Francis, 2015: 51).
Keywords: ecological debt; developing country commodity exports; pollution 
havens
1. INTRODUCTION
The central idea in Laudato Si’ is Pope Francis’s concern for the future 
of our planet and his moral appeal to “every person living on [it]” to 
engage in an inclusive dialog on sustainable and integral development. 
In paragraph 51, Francis introduces the idea of ecological debt and states 
that “a true ecological debt” exists between the global North and South. 
In his view, over-consumption on the part of the global North has led 
to a disproportionate use of natural resources extracted from the global 
South, resulting in local environmental damage for the latter. The debt 
thus arises when raw materials are exported from poor nations (South) 
to rich nations (North) to satisfy the latter’s appetites.
Francis also draws attention to the operations of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in poor countries, asserting that such companies 
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operate in ways that “they would never do at home” (Francis, 2015: 51). 
He notes that the pollution produced by MNCs in less developed 
countries (LDCs) results in great human and environmental liabilities 
such as unemployment, abandoned towns, the depletion of natural 
reserves, deforestation, and the impoverishment of agriculture and local 
stock breeding, among others (Francis, 2015: 51). These indictments 
of the nature of globalization form the foundation of what the Pope 
defines as “ecological debt”—a phenomenon where the global South 
continues to fuel the development of the global North at its own peril 
(Francis, 2015: 52).
In this article, we examine the arguments inherent in paragraph 51 
of Laudato Si’ in an empirical framework. First, we provide a historical 
perspective on the notion of ecological debt as enunciated in the 
encyclical. Second, we explore the Pope’s indictment of MNCs via an 
examination of the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH), which suggests 
that pollution-intensive industries in developed countries relocate 
their “dirty” operations to developing countries with relatively lax 
environmental regulations (Dinda, 2004). For our empirical analysis, 
we will emend the standard arguments of the PHH.
We propose that MNC activities related to natural resource extraction 
and commodity export production in developing countries are positively 
associated with pollution as measured by greenhouse gas levels. 
Furthermore, such activities and resultant pollution are subject to less 
stringent regulations due to the imperatives of economic growth in these 
LDCs. In other words, an ecological debt is created when commodity 
exports from developing countries to more developed ones come at 
the cost of the environment in the former. Our article thus connects 
Laudato Si’ with the PHH, thereby enabling us to examine empirically 
Francis’s statement that the “export of raw materials to satisfy markets 
in the industrialized North has caused harm locally” (Francis, 2015: 51).
In the second section that follows, we trace the evolution and usage of 
the term “ecological debt” from the mid-1980s to Francis’s references in 
Laudato Si’. Section 3 outlines some issues in the estimation of ecological 
debt and motivates our empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the 
pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) and derives two testable hypotheses 
that link the export production activities of MNCs to pollution in 
developing economies. Section 5 details our methodology and Section 
6 presents our econometric results. Finally, Section 7 concludes 
with a discussion of the results, limitations of the study, and future 
research directions.
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2. ECOLOGICAL DEBT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Prior to its reference in Laudato Si’, the notion of “ecological debt” was 
understood and used by grassroots and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) as an activist term that focused on the lack of political power of 
poor regions and countries. Literature documents the first use of the term 
at a 1985 World Conference on Women held in Nairobi. As reported by 
Warlenius et al. (2015), an eco-feminist named Eva Quirstop articulated 
the concept of ecological debt in the following manner: 
The debts we are paying are numerous: ecological debts, caused by the 
plundering, pollution, and irreversible destruction of our natural resources 
and making it ever more difficult for women to secure the existential basis 
for their lives and those of their children. (Warlenius et al., 2015: 8)
The term was subsequently discussed at a 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro. 
Conference participants formulated a so-called Debt Treaty that 
acknowledged the existence of a planetary ecological debt owing to 
the actions of the global North in exploiting the resources of the global 
South. The treaty maintained that developed countries owed a debt to 
the less developed ones in light of resource over-utilization and resultant 
environmental damage, and demanded the establishment of a system to 
quantify the cumulative debt of the developed countries over the course 
of the last five hundred years.
In 1999, the term “ecological debt” grew in prominence through 
the activities of an Ecuadorian NGO, Acción Ecológica (AE), which 
defined ecological debt as “the responsibility that the industrialized 
countries have for the gradual destruction of the planet caused by their 
production and consumption patterns” (Paredis, Goeminne, Vanhove, 
Maes, & Lambrecht, 2008: 6). The following year, AE partnered with 
Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) to launch a campaign to 
understand ecological debt. AE and FOEI organized a network of NGOs 
and founded the Southern People’s Ecological Debt Creditors Alliance 
(SPEDCA), the aim of which was to push for an international recognition 
of ecological debt.
By 2005, several NGO networks in Latin America and Europe began 
to adopt the language of ecological debt as their main campaign theme. 
In 2008, five Latin American countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, and Nicaragua—mentioned ecological debt in their public 
address to the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development and 
raised calls for its valuation. In the same year, the Centre for Sustainable 
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Development (CSD) at Ghent University proposed a working definition 
of ecological debt, defining it as
1. the ecological damage caused over time by a country, 
through its production and consumption patterns, in 
other countries; 
2. the ecological damage caused over time by a country, 
through its production and consumption patterns, in 
ecosystems beyond its natural jurisdiction; and
3. the exploitation or use of ecosystems (and their goods 
and services) over time by a country at the expense of 
the equitable rights of other countries to these ecosystems 
(Paredis et al., 2008: 145).
Francis’s direct reference to ecological debt in Laudato Si’ has 
since reinvigorated discussion of the term. In paragraph 51, Francis 
acknowledges a “true ecological debt” between the global North and 
South that stems from harmful environmental impacts of global trade 
and the disproportionate use of renewable and non-renewable natural 
resources by developed countries over long periods of time. The Pope’s 
call for a recognition of ecological debt was also echoed at the Paris 
climate talks in December 2015, where many developing countries asked 
for an acknowledgement of ecological debt as well as a climate finance 
plan to deal with it.2
3. ESTIMATING ECOLOGICAL DEBT
It has always been easier to define rather than operationalize 
ecological debt. This section summarizes some studies that attempt to 
estimate it. Paredis et al. (2008) identifies two main methods: the first 
is an ecological damage-based approach that looks at specific indicators 
of ecological damage such as deforestation and overfishing, and the 
second is based on an ecological deficit approach that employs an 
ecological footprint framework. This latter estimates the over-usage of a 
2French Prime Minister Francois Hollande explicitly acknowledged that “there is an 
ecological debt that the world needs to pay back to Africa” as he convened a special 
session focusing on climate finance on the continent. At the talks, Hollande promised to 
provide €2 billion in sustainable energy investment for the African continent as a move 
toward debt repayment (https://europeansting.com/2015/12/02/there-is-an-ecological-
debt-that-the-world-needs-to-pay-back-to-africa-french-president-francois-hollande-
promises-2-bn-euros-from-cop21-in-paris/).
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resource relative to locally available capacity. Both approaches have been 
employed by environmental economists.
Srinivasan et al. (2008) employ an ecological damage lens to estimate 
ecological debt. Their analysis is based on a Net Present Value (NPV) 
methodology as they estimate the environmental costs of human 
activities from 1961 to 2000 across six major categories (climate change, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, agricultural intensification and expansion, 
deforestation, overfishing, and mangrove conservation) for poor, middle 
income, and rich countries. The researchers found that climate change 
and ozone depletion impacts upon developing countries are significantly 
driven by middle income and rich countries.
Torras (2003) calculates ecological debt using the ecological deficit 
approach discussed above. His estimates and assumptions are based on the 
Living Planet Report (Loh, 2000) and work done by Costanza et al. (1998). 
He calculates ecological deficits for developed countries and ecological 
surpluses for less developed countries and assigns monetary values to his 
estimates (in dollars). He also focuses on total exports from developing 
countries (LDCs) as these exports represent an ever-increasing transfer of 
bio-capacity from LDCs to support consumption in developed countries 
(Torras, 2003). 
Paredis et al. (2008) propose an alternate and simpler methodology 
to estimate carbon (ecological) debt that relies on calculating a country’s 
cumulative carbon emissions over and above a sustainable emission level 
relative to the country’s population. Warlenius et al. (2015) propose an 
estimate based on the gross accumulated greenhouse gas emissions of 
a country as compared to a globally sustainable level of total emissions 
(adjusted for population).
While the above methodologies do provide a helpful framework 
in which to monetize ecological debt, major data deficiencies hinder 
them as adequate measures of such. Indeed, several academics have 
critiqued efforts and related methodologies for quantifying ecological 
debt. Rice (2009), for instance, notes that there is no consensus or a 
universal method for calculating ecological debt.
One deficiency of the studies on ecological debt mentioned above is 
that they ignore the linkages between exports, FDI by MNCs, and total 
greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis attempts to address this deficiency 
by empirically examining ecological debt from the perspective of an 
(emended) PHH. In resonance with the arguments made in Laudato Si’, 
we propose that the commodity export production undertaken by MNCs 
in developing countries to satisfy demand in developed countries is 
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positively associated with pollution. In the sections that follow, our 
analysis will be motivated by reviews of literature relevant to the PHH. 
We will also rely on the working definition of ecological debt provided 
by the Centre for Sustainable Development, particularly on the point 
that ecological debt is the amount of ecological damage caused over 
time by a country, through its production and consumption patterns, 
in ecosystems beyond its natural jurisdiction.
4. MNCS AND THE POLLUTION HAVEN HYPOTHESIS (PHH)
A rich vein of empirical literature supports the operations of the PHH 
(Dinda, 2004), which posits that companies, when faced with stricter 
environmental regulations or higher costs associated with pollution 
control at home, simply relocate manufacturing to locations with less 
stringent regulations or lower costs associated with pollution control. 
For instance, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) examined the pattern of U.S. 
foreign investment in Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco, and Côte d’Ivoire 
and found some evidence to indicate that such investments are skewed 
toward sectors with high pollution abatement costs. Cole, Elliott, and 
Okubo (2010) examined industry-level data for Japan and observed, after 
accounting for geographic immobility of an industry, that pollution 
haven effects are stronger and more discernible when trade in industries 
with the greatest environmental costs occurs with developing countries.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) undertaken by MNCs is an important 
variable related to the PHH. Weak environmental regulation in less 
developed host countries may attract FDI inflow from profit driven 
companies that want to avoid costly regulations in their home countries 
(Jensen, 1996). But while FDI inflows can promote economic growth, 
they might also have a negative impact on the environment (Xing & 
Kolstad, 2002; He, 2006), and can also contribute significantly to the 
host country’s industrial output which in turn increases overall pollution 
(Zarsky, 1999).
That FDI inflows contribute to increased pollution and CO2 emissions, 
especially in countries in middle and low stages of development, have 
been demonstrated by empirical studies (Grimes & Kentor, 2003; 
Hoffmann, Lee, Ramasamy, & Yeung, 2005). Such findings resonate 
with the Pope’s statement on ecological debt as well as his indictment 
of MNCs in developing economies, and deserve further attention. In 
this regard, we propose two testable linkages—one that links FDI by 
MNCs to commodity exports from developing countries to high income 
countries, and another that links such commodity exports to greenhouse 
gas pollution.
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4.1. FDI and commodity exports
Clausing (2000) investigates the operations of U.S. MNCs in 29 host 
(developing) countries from 1977 to 1994 and finds a strong positive 
influence of FDI on exports. Tang (2015) observes that export-oriented FDI 
is more sensitive to local environmental regulations than local market-
oriented FDI. Liu, Burridge, and Sinclair (2002) and Pacheco-López 
(2005) provide evidence suggestive of a bi-causality between exports and 
FDI. However, Dritsaki et al. (2004) document a unidirectional causality 
from FDI by MNCs to export growth. Similarly, Bhatt (2013) provides 
empirical evidence supporting a positive association between FDI and 
export growth for Vietnam. Xuan and Xing (2008) also provide empirical 
evidence linking FDI as one of the major factors driving the rapid export 
growth of Vietnam. Liu, Wang, and Wei (2001) studied China’s aggregate 
trade and FDI relationships with individual partner countries. Causality 
tests reveal that inward FDI undertaken by MNCs was associated with a 
significant rise in exports to the investing country. Makki and Somwaru 
(2004) and Mehrara et al. (2010) find a causality in the reverse direction 
and note that export growth attracts FDI to developing countries.
Rice (2007) tries to measure the impact of resource exports from 
low and middle income countries to eleven countries in the global 
North. The study notes that the export of resources from LDCs fuels 
an overconsumption in developed countries at the expense of the 
LDCs’ ability to utilize their own biocapacity. Such research supports 
the proposition that FDI promotes exports that fuel the global North’s 
overconsumption, thereby shifting the externality to less developed 
nations. In fact, an UNCTAD (2011) report states that FDI undertaken by 
MNCs in developing and less developed countries has resulted mainly 
in export-oriented primary production which actually has had limited 
impact on local employment. The report also states that FDI inflows 
largely target countries rich in natural resources. 
This review of the literature leads us to our first hypothesis (H1): 
FDI to commodity exporting developing countries is positively associated with 
commodity exports from such countries to high income countries.
4.2. Commodity exports and total greenhouse gas emissions
There is empirical evidence that indicates a positive association 
between exports and the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Grether 
and Mathys (2013) studied the effect of exports and imports on carbon 
emissions using data covering 62 countries. Their findings reveal that 
poor and emerging countries such as Indonesia, China, and Chile exhibit 
high emission intensities for exports relative to imports while large, 
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rich countries such as the U.S., Germany, and Japan are characterized 
by lower emission intensities for exports compared to their imports. 
Anatasia (2015) provides empirical evidence of a unidirectional Granger 
causality running from exports to CO2 emissions in the case of Thailand 
and Malaysia for the period covering 1978–2008.
Weber et al. (2008) studied the impact of exports on Chinese CO2 
emissions during the period covering 1987–2005. They observed that 
almost 60% of Chinese exports go to the developed world for their 
consumption and that almost one-third of Chinese CO2 emissions were 
generated by the production of such goods for export. Li et al. (2014) 
calculated the CO2 emissions embodied in the bilateral trade between 
China and 112 other countries/regions. Their results show that the flows 
of embodied CO2 emissions in export trade are highly concentrated, 
with the United States and Japan accounting for 1/4th and 1/7th of the 
total CO2 emissions in export trade, respectively. Shui and Harriss (2006) 
examined the U.S.-China trade during the period covering 1997–2003 
to understand the impact of exports to the U.S. on the CO2 emissions in 
China. The results reveal that if the U.S. had produced the same quantity 
of products domestically rather than importing them from China, the 
CO2 emissions in the U.S. would have increased by 3% (1997 and 1998) to 
6% (2003) higher than the reported levels. Meanwhile, the CO2 emissions 
in China due to the production of exports to the U.S. accounted for 7% 
(1997) to 14% (2002 and 2003) of China’s annual CO2 emissions.
This leads us to our second hypothesis (H2): exports by commodity 
exporting developing countries to high-income countries are positively associated 
with total GHG emissions.
In the next section, we discuss our methodology before subjecting 
our hypotheses to econometric testing.
5. METHODOLOGY
We obtained a list of 52 commodity exporting emerging market and 
developing economies3 from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
World Economic Outlook report (2015) (see Table 1). To test H1, we 
utilized data from the World Development Indicators Database (World 
Bank Group, 2015) and examined the association between FDI inflows 
3Commodity exporters are emerging market and developing economies for which 
gross exports of commodities constitute at least 35% of total exports and net exports of 
commodities constitute at least 5% of exports-plus imports on average, based on the 
available data for 1960–2014.
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and exports for our panel of commodity exporting countries over the 
period covering 1991–2011.4 Missing data, however, restricted our sample 
to 45 countries.
There is evidence in the literature of endogeneity between FDI and 
exports. Singh and Jun (1995) suggest that the relationship between 
exports and FDI may be simultaneous. A Hausman test also indicated 
endogeneity5 between FDI and exports in our sample. To address this 
issue, we constructed an instrumental variable estimate of FDI6 (FDINST) 
that we used in our test of H1.
HEXP = C(1) + C(2)*FDINST+ C(3)*LAG FDINST + C(4)*GFCF_GDP + 
C(5) LABFRC + error
Where, 
HEXP = Exports to high-income countries as a percentage of GDP.7 
FDINST = Instrumental variable estimate of FDI
4The year 2011 was the last period for which data was available. Seven countries 
from our original sample of 52 commodity exporting emerging market and developing 
economies had to be excluded due to missing data.
5The Hausman Test (also called the Hausman specification test) 
detects endogenous regressors (predictor variables) in a regression model. There is also 
evidence of Granger bi-causality between FDI and exports as discussed in section 4.
6We used the following equation:
FDIN = C(1) + C(2)*GDPGR + C(3)*TRADEINT + C(4)*INFLCPI + C(5)*GOVTEXPGDP + ε
where FDIN represents the inward flow of foreign direct investment to an economy and 
GDPGR represents the real GDP growth rate. Here we posited that FDI is attracted to 
economies with higher growth rates. The variable TRADEINT represents trade intensity 
and is a proxy for trade openness; it has been used in the literature as a proxy for the 
openness of an economy. We used this as a proxy for trade intensity measured by 
exports as a percentage of GDP plus imports as a percentage of GDP, and posited that 
a more “open” economy attracts more FDI. The variable INFLCPI measures the level 
of inflation in an economy and serves as a proxy for risk. We posited that high inflation 
reduces the attractiveness of an economy to FDI inflows. Finally, GOVTEXPGDP 
represents the proportion of government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
7To estimate HEXP, we obtained data on total merchandise exports (MEX) and 
merchandise exports to high-income countries as a percentage of MEX (MEXPCNT) 
from the World Development Indicators database. We then obtained GDP data for each 
economy and calculated HEXP as follows: HEXP = (MEX*MEXPCNT)/GDP.
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GFCF_GDP = Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP. 
We expected this variable to be positively associated with exports to 
high-income countries, thereby reflecting a higher investment in fixed 
capacity building and infrastructure. 
LABFRC = the logged value of the labor force in a country. LABFRC 
was expected to be positively associated with exports to high-income 
countries, thereby reflecting a larger labor pool. 
We estimated a fixed-effects regression and used robust standard 
errors to account for heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. 
Consistent with H1, we expected the coefficients C(2) and C(3) to be 
positive and significant, indicating that exports to high-income countries 
were impelled by FDI to commodity exporting developing economies. 
To test our second hypothesis, H2, we obtained data for an initial list 
of 214 countries over the period covering 1991–2011 which was available 
from the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank Group, 
2015). However, due to missing data, our final sample consisted of 94 
countries of which 27 are commodity exporting emerging market and 
developing economies (see Table 3). We estimated the following fixed-
effects regression:
T O T A L G R N G S E M P C A P  =  C ( 1 )  +  C ( 2 ) * G D P P C A P  + 
C(3)*GDPPCAP*COMEX + C(4)*POPDENSE + C(5)*HEXPPCAP + 
C(6)*(HEXPPCAP)*COMEX + C(7)*CRISIS 
+ C(8)*ELECTOILGASCOAL + C(9)*ELECTRENEWNOHYDRO + 
C(10)*EMPINDUSTRY + C(11)*ENRGYUSEPCAP + C(12)*AGRIVALADD 
+ C(13)*FOREST + error
Where,
TOTALGRNGSEMPCAP = total greenhouse gas emissions per capita. 
GDPPCAP = GDP per capita. Research on the environmental Kuznets 
curve (EKC) suggests a positive association between GDP per capita 
and greenhouse emissions per capita. We expected this relationship 
to be significantly more positive for commodity exporting countries 
(Panayotou, 1993).
COMEX = an indicator variable for a commodity exporting country, 
equal to “1” for each commodity exporter, “0” otherwise.
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POPDENSE = Population density. There is evidence which indicates 
that greenhouse emissions increase/decrease with population density. 
Selden and Song (1994) and Patel et al. (1995) claim that an increase in 
population density might cause increased awareness of environmental 
impacts, resulting in more pressure to adopt stringent environmental 
standards and clean technologies. However, emissions may increase 
with population density if changes in settlement patterns necessitated 
by population growth result in requiring more transport, resources, 
goods, and services. Moreover, a higher population density might create 
demand for energy-intensive services that would not be required in areas 
with a low population density (Holdren, 1991).
HEXPPCAP = Merchandise exports to high-income countries on a 
per capita basis. We expected a significantly positive association between 
total greenhouse gas emissions and merchandise exports to high-income 
countries. This variable is our proxy for the “Global North” as discussed 
in Laudato Si’. 
CRISIS = is a dummy variable for the financial crisis in 2008–2009. 
We expected a decrease in this variable to be associated with a decrease 
in the level of economic activity.
ELECTOILGASCOAL = percentage of electricity generated by fossil 
fuels. We expected total greenhouse gas emissions to increase with the 
increased use of fossil fuels. 
ELECTRENEWNOHYDRO = percentage of electricity generated by 
renewable sources other than hydro-electricity. We expected a decrease 
in total greenhouse gas emissions associated with this variable.
EMPINDUSTRY = Percentage employed in industry. We expected an 
increase in total greenhouse gas emissions to be associated with higher 
levels of industrialization in an economy.
AGRIVALADD = Value-added from agriculture as a percent of GDP. 
Agricultural activities are relatively less pollution intensive compared to 
manufacturing, although in keeping with the literature, the coefficient 
could be positive or negative. However, rising GHGs are also associated 
with agricultural activities such as livestock rearing, maintaining 
nitrogenous agricultural soils, and specifically rice production 
(Russell, 2014).
ENRGYUSEPCAP = Energy used per capita. We expected higher 
greenhouse gas emissions from economies where the energy use per 
capita is higher.
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FOREST = Percentage of forest land to land area. We expected lower 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions to be associated with economies with 
a greater proportion of forested land. This could be for two reasons. First, 
it is possible that less industrially developed economies emit lower levels 
of greenhouse gas. Second, forests may serve as sponges that absorb 
carbon emissions.
Initial descriptive statistics of the variables used in our model to 
test H2 are presented in Table 4. We compared the key variables for our 
commodity exporting countries with the rest of the countries in our 
sample and provided basic univariate statistics. Consistent with H2, we 
expected the interaction coefficient C(6) to be significantly positive, 
indicating that exports to high-income countries are incrementally and 
positively associated with greenhouse gas emissions.
6. RESULTS
Our econometric results for H1 are displayed in Table 2. Consistent 
with our expectations and H1, we observed that contemporaneous FDI 
inflows to commodity exporting countries are significantly associated 
with an increase in exports to high-income countries. Indeed, such 
resource-seeking FDI inflows seem to impel said exports. 
Contrary to our expectations, however, the variable GFCF_GDP was 
significantly but negatively associated with HEXP. This could be because 
GFCF_GDP stimulated the domestic economy and “crowded-out” any 
impact on export-based activities. None of the other variables achieved 
statistical significance.
Our results for H2 are displayed in Table 5. We found that the 
GDPPCAP, ELECTOILGASCOAL, EMPINDUSTRY, ENERGYUSEPCAP, 
and AGRIVALADD are positively and significantly associated with 
total greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, economies with higher levels of 
GDP per capita, fossil fuel consumption, employment in the industry, 
and energy use per capita emit higher levels of greenhouse gases per 
capita. Contrary to our expectations, however, FOREST is significantly 
and positively associated with GHGs. It is possible that this variable is 
in effect a proxy for the level of activities such as exploration for and 
discovery of minerals, oil, and natural gas deposits. Greenhouse gas 
emissions were reduced significantly during the crisis in 2008 and 2009 
that saw lowered levels of economic activity.
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We observed that coefficient C(5) of the variable HEXPPCAP (per 
capita exports to high-income countries) is negative and significant, 
indicating that these exports reduce total greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, consistent with our expectations and H2, we observed that 
the coefficient C(6) for the interaction term HEXPPCAP*COMEX that 
measures the incremental impact of such exports to high-income 
countries is significantly positive. Unlike the rest of the sample, such 
exports to high income countries are associated with a significant and 
positive increase in total greenhouse gas emissions. To test the robustness 
of our results, we re-ran the regression without the interaction term on 
just the 27 COMEX countries in this sample.8 We observed that the 
coefficient on the variable HEXPPCAP is significantly positive. In other 
words, exports from commodity exporting countries to high-income 
countries are associated with an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. 
This finding is consistent with the statements made by the Pope in 
Laudato Si’, paragraph 51.
Taken together, our hypotheses validate several points raised in 
paragraph 51 of Laudato Si’, especially when viewed from the perspective 
of the PHH and the activities of MNCs. Our econometrics establishes a 
significant association between FDI undertaken by MNCs in developing 
countries and commodity exports from these countries. Results also 
indicate that such exports to the global North (high income countries) 
are significantly associated with higher greenhouse gas emissions. In 
sum, the Pope’s claim that the “export of raw materials to satisfy markets 
in the industrialized North has caused harm locally” (Francis, 2015: 51) 
appears to be empirically valid with regard to our sample.
7. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In response to evidence of the role of human activities in accelerating 
climate change through increased carbon emissions, the Pope’s encyclical 
calls for recognition of a global “ecological debt.” Francis asserts that 
exports from poor countries to the industrialized North are associated 
with significant harm to the local environments of the former. Our 
results demonstrate that this assertion is empirically valid for our sample 
of commodity exporting developing countries.
The Pope argues that rich countries should help pay this debt by 
reducing their emissions and by actively helping poor countries put into 
8Since the results were qualitatively similar, we did not tabulate them.
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place policies and programs that support sustainable development. An 
alternative policy recommendation stemming from our analysis would 
also suggest carbon taxation as a viable option for commodity exporters 
looking to reduce carbon emissions. This might incentivize MNCs to 
consider carbon mitigation strategies as they engage in commodity 
extraction from developing countries. Finally, stricter regulation of 
the environment and enforcement of environmental laws in these 
developing countries are also called for.
In the end, our empirical analysis does in no way imply that 
commodity exporting developing countries should cut GHGs at the 
expense of their economic growth. Rather, we suggest that these 
countries look at sustainable development models that enable them to 
meet the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future 
generations. The U.N.’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) offer 
a blueprint for action in this regard (United Nations, 2015); these goals 
prioritize areas such as climate change, sustainable production and 
consumption, and social justice, among others.
It should be noted, however, that the concept of ecological debt is 
complex, and that this article is an initial attempt to examine one aspect 
of its manifestation, namely in the form of commodity exports from the 
global South. But the ecological debt that the North owes to the South 
cannot be estimated simply by a panel data set covering a certain period; 
any comprehensive study of this issue must include recognition of such 
debt as having accumulated over a historical range. Moreover, such a 
study may be complicated by the fact that it would have to consider 
colonial histories of exploitation and weak institutions in commodity 
exporting countries that ignore environmental damage, institutions 
that may have chosen to emphasize growth over environmental 
regulation. Also, any estimation of ecological debt should normalize 
carbon emissions in commodity exporting economies to their level of 
development and the level of pollution emitted by domestic producers.
Our study is also limited by insufficient data on commodity 
exporters. We also would have liked to disaggregate FDI flows by industry 
and by country to get a clearer picture, but such data are simply not 
available. Furthermore, we are unable to discern whether GHGs in our 
sample of commodity exporters would have persisted even if there was 
no FDI by MNCs. Are domestic producers cleaner than foreign MNCs? 
This question and others like it are beyond the scope of the present study, 
though they can represent an area of future research.
Issues inherent in the financing of green growth imperatives are also 
suggesting other areas of future research. For instance, can developing 
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economies sustain their economic growth to alleviate poverty while 
maintaining a low carbon intensity economy? How can business, 
government, and the civil sector work collaboratively to address these 
global issues? In this context, many economists have pushed government 
efforts to put a price on carbon pollution, either with a tax or a cap-and-
trade program in which governments charge a fee to carbon polluters 
and where industry and market players can buy and sell carbon credits 
among themselves. Future research can focus on these policies and their 
impact on economic growth.
Country Country
Algeria Kazakhstan
Angola Kuwait
Argentina Libya
Azerbaijan Malaysia
Bahrain Mauritania
Bolivia Mongolia
Brazil Mozambique
Brunei Darussalam Myanmar
Cameroon Nicaragua
Chad Niger
Chile Nigeria
Colombia Oman
Congo, Rep. Papua New Guinea
Costa Rica Paraguay
Cote d’Ivoire Peru
Ecuador Qatar
Gabon Russian Federation
Ghana South Sudan
Guatemala Syrian Arab Republic
Guinea Tajikistan
Guyana Trinidad and Tobago
Honduras Turkmenistan
Indonesia United Arab Emirates
Iran, Islamic Rep. Uruguay
Saudi Arabia Venezuela, RB
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
Table 1: List of Commodity Exporting Emerging Market and Developing Economies 
(IMF, 2015)
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Dependent Variable: HEXP    
Sample: 1991–2011    
Cross-sections included: 45    
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 717    
     
Variable Coefficient Signif.
     
C 2.101176  
FDINST 2.249685 ***
LAGGED FDINST 0.455195  
GFCF_GDP -0.195415 **
LABFRC 1.1284  
     
R-squared 0.868109  
F-statistic 89.59636 ***
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 717  
*** = Significant at p < 0.01 level
**= Significant at p < 0.05 level
* = Significant at p < 0.10 level
Table 2: Association between Exports to High-Income Countries and FDI to 
Commodity Exporting Countries
Commodity 
Exporting (27) Other Countries Other Countries
Algeria Albania Cambodia
Argentina Armenia Korea, Rep.
Azerbaijan Australia Sri Lanka
Bolivia Austria Lithuania
Brazil Belgium Luxembourg
Chile Bulgaria Latvia
Colombia Bosnia and Herzegovina Moldova
Costa Rica Belarus Mexico
Ecuador Canada Macedonia, FYR
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Commodity 
Exporting (27) Other Countries Other Countries
Guatemala Switzerland Malta
Honduras China Netherlands
Indonesia Cuba Norway
Iran, Islamic Rep. Cyprus New Zealand
Kazakhstan Czech Republic Pakistan
Malaysia Germany Panama
Mongolia Denmark Philippines
Nicaragua Dominican Republic Poland
Paraguay Egypt, Arab Rep. Portugal
Peru Spain Romania
Russian Federation Estonia Singapore
Saudi Arabia Ethiopia El Salvador
Syrian Arab Republic Finland Slovak Republic
Trinidad and Tobago France Slovenia
United Arab 
Emirates
United Kingdom Sweden
Uruguay Georgia Thailand
Venezuela, RB Greece Tunisia
Yemen, Rep. Croatia Turkey
  Hungary Ukraine
  Ireland United States
  Iceland Uzbekistan
  Italy Vietnam
  Jordan South Africa
  Japan Morocco
  Kyrgyz Republic  
Table 3: List of 94 Sample Countries Used to Test H2
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Other 
(67 Countries)
Comex 
(27 Countries)
Country-
Years
Signif. 
Variables Mean Mean
Value Added from 
Agriculture (% of GDP)
10.92 11.99 2457 **
Labor Force 24141499 15370395 2139 ***
Electricity Generated from 
Fossil Fuels (% of Total)
58.99 57.99 2597
Employment in Industry 
(% of Total)
25.95 22.95 2070 ***
Exports (% of GDP) 42.12 33.45 2632 ***
Exports to High Income 
Countries (% of GDP)
21.69 18.12 2598 ***
FDI Inflows (% of GDP) 3.53 3.03 2516 **
Forest Area (% of Total 
Area)
28.5 31.46 2005 ***
Real GDP Growth Rate 3.12 3.51 2715 *
GDP Per Capita ($) 15807 5096 2728 ***
Exports to High Income 
Countries per capita
390693 108786 2650 ***
Total Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (kt of CO2 
equivalent per capita)
10.25 10.12 2790
Ores and Metals Exports 
(% of merchandise exports)
5.24 9.41 2385 ***
Agricultural Raw 
Materials Exports (% of 
merchandise exports)
3.25 5.05 2383 ***
*** = Significant at p < 0.01 level
** = Significant at p < 0.05 level 
* = Significant at p < 0.10 level
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables
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Dependent Variable: TOTALGRNGSEMPCAP    
Sample: 1991–2011    
Cross-sections included: 94    
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1428    
     
Variable Coefficient Prob. 
     
C -7.304456 ***
GDPPCAP 0.000147 **
GDPPCAP*COMEX -0.000399  
POPDENSE -0.000182  
HEXPPCAP -1.41E-06 ***
(HEXPPCAP)*COMEX 7.84E-06 ***
CRISIS -0.40442 **
ELECTOILGASCOAL 0.03078 ***
ELECTRENEWNOHYDRO -0.032003  
EMPINDUSTRY 0.0793 **
ENRGYUSEPCAP 0.002135 ***
AGRIVALADD 0.062751 **
FOREST 0.184068 ***
     
R-squared 0.937359  
F-statistic 186.4837 ***
*** = Significant at p < 0.01 level
** = Significant at p < 0.05 level 
* = Significant at p < 0.10 level
Table 5: Association between Exports and Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions per 
Capita for Sample Countries
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